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Abstract—Mobile Shopping Applications (MSAs) are rapidly
gaining popularity. They enhance the shopping experience,
by offering customized recommendations or incorporating
customer loyalty programs. Although MSAs are quite effective
at attracting new customers and binding existing ones to
a retailer’s services, existing MSAs have several shortcom-
ings. The data collection practices involved in MSAs and
the lack of transparency thereof are important concerns for
many customers. This paper presents inShopnito, a privacy-
preserving mobile shopping application. All transactions made
in inShopnito are unlinkable and anonymous. However, the
system still offers the expected features from a modern MSA.
Customers can take part in loyalty programs and earn or spend
loyalty points and electronic vouchers. Furthermore, the MSA
can suggest personalized recommendations even though the
retailer cannot construct rich customer profiles. These profiles
are managed on the smartphone and can be partially disclosed
in order to get better, customized recommendations. Finally,
we present an implementation called inShopnito, of which the
security and performance is analyzed. In doing so, we show
that it is possible to have a privacy-preserving MSA without
having to sacrifice practicality.
Keywords-Software Engineering; Security; Privacy ; Mobile
Applications
I. INTRODUCTION
MSAs are (usually smartphone-based) applications that
provide customers with an enhanced shopping experience.
They are convenient to deploy, as most people carry smart-
phones and are already familiar with mobile applications.
One important feature of an MSA is to facilitate the par-
ticipation in Customer Loyalty Programs (CLPs) [1]–[4].
Customers enrolled in a CLP receive different incentives
(e.g., loyalty points, discount vouchers, gifts, etc.) on each
transaction with the retailer. They can collect loyalty points
that can later be exchanged for discounts or promotional
items. CLPs allow providers not only to encourage loyal
behaviour but also to collect and analyze data about cus-
tomers (e.g., brand preferences, average spending, etc.).
This information is useful to retailers for planning better
marketing and advertising strategies. In addition, MSAs can
provide more advanced services, for instance support for
mobile identity management and payments [5]. Furthermore,
they can enhance the shopping experience by providing
relevant recommendations to their users.
Unfortunately, existing MSAs have major shortcomings
that hinder their complete adoption. Current data collec-
tion practices raise privacy concerns among customers. For
instance, a recent survey [6] shows that nearly 30% of
the participants think that CLPs require too much personal
information and 24% indicated that privacy concerns are
the reason why they do not enroll in such programs.
These privacy concerns have given CLPs a negative rep-
utation [7]–[9]. In addition, this problem is even worse
for the smartphone-based MSAs because they can use the
customer’s smartphone to gather additional information, like
the current geolocation or the customer’s actual identity.
Finally, although the collected information allows retailers
to send customized and more accurate recommendations to
the MSA, it is unclear what data exactly is collected by the
MSA, and what retailers actually do with the data (e.g., sell
it to a third party).
In this paper we present inShopnito, a privacy-friendly
mobile shopping application. inShopnito incorporates a se-
ries of security- and privacy-enhancing technologies into
a full-fledged MSA. Retailers can reward customers with
anonymous and unlinkable loyalty points and electronic
vouchers. In addition, transactional data is securely stored
and managed on the smartphone itself, resulting in local
profiles controlled by customers. Users can opt-in to disclose
parts of their (anonymized) profile in order to get cus-
tomized recommendations from a recommendation system,
without sacrificing their privacy. Furthermore, the integrity
of the revealed information is protected by inShopnito and,
therefore the data collected by providers is not only less
sensitive, but also more accurate. In addition, inShopnito
could be used to combine CLPs from multiple providers,
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thus, facilitating cooperation. Finally, the system facilitates
retailers to comply with privacy laws because the gathered
data is less sensitive.
In short, this paper makes the following key contributions:
• Design of security- and privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies. We designed several privacy-preserving alterna-
tives for current technologies used in an MSA: a loyalty
system, electronic vouchers and a recommendation sys-
tem. In addition, a secure storage component provides
strong security guarantees for the data stored on the
mobile device.
• Integration in inShopnito. We present inShopnito, a
privacy-protecting MSA which offers many of the same
benefits for customers as well as retailers compared to
the traditional approach without sacrificing practicality.
• Implementation and evaluation of our proposed
solution. We implemented the inShopnito system and
created an Android application to demonstrate its fea-
sibility. Our experimental results show that inShopnito
is indeed practical to use with a transaction time of less
then three seconds.
II. RELATED WORK
Even though privacy is recognized as an important issue
in loyalty schemes [10], [11], there is not a significant body
of research addressing this issue. The existing proposals for
privacy in loyalty schemes usually focus on unlinkability of
the loyalty points issued to the user. For instance, in the
proposal by Enzmann and Schneider [12], blind signatures
are utilized to avoid linking loyalty points in the issuing and
the spending interaction with the provider. However, their
proposed solution cannot securely prevent the users from
sharing their loyalty points. On the other hand, Marquardt
et al. suggest that users anonymously download a loyalty
card from a large pool to assure their privacy [13]. Although
the users remain anonymous towards the provider, their
loyalty cannot be measured. A common issue for these
two approaches is that the retailer cannot record any data,
even with user consent. The shopping data that is collected
through the loyalty system is also employed for determining
the interests and for offering relevant products to the user.
Work by Hardt and Nath [14] allows users to choose the
amount of personal information that is to be disclosed to an
ad server in order to be offered personalized ads. The user
sends (a part of) personal preferences to the ad server, which
are used for coarse-grained filtering of ads that are sent to
user’s device. The user application then performs the final
filtering of the received ads based on the stored details on
the user preferences.
III. INSHOPNITO
inShopnito is an MSA that allows customers and retailers
to take advantage of mobile platforms without sacrificing
customer’s privacy. To achieve this goal, inShopnito re-
lies on the following main components (Figure 1): anony-
mous credential management, privacy-preserving loyalty and
voucher schemes, privacy-preserving recommendations and
a secure storage mechanism. Thanks to these mechanisms,
inShopnito supports shopping sessions (i.e., purchases, loy-
alty point and voucher operations) that are anonymous and
unlinkable by default; thus, reducing the privacy concerns
associated with the data collected by retailers. With in-
Shopnito, customers have better control over their personal
data, as identifiable session information is securely stored
on their smartphones1 (instead of the retailer’s database).
Still, customers can optionally disclose additional infor-
mation from their local profiles to receive more accurate
recommendations and personalized services. Furthermore,
inShopnito also provides several benefits to retailers such
as support for advanced functionality (e.g., context-based
recommendations and family loyalty schemes), improved
control and security over loyalty and voucher operations and
better integrity guarantees for the anonymous data collected.
A. Threat model
inShopnito’s design considers different adversaries. First,
malicious customers that try to abuse or misuse the appli-
cation for their benefit. For this purpose, they may attempt
to forge, modify, steal or illegally share credentials, loyalty
points or vouchers. In addition, they may also try to double-
spend loyalty points or vouchers. Second, an honest-but-
curious retailer that tries to break the privacy guaran-
tees offered by inShopnito wile still following the defined
protocols. For example, the retailer may try to discover
customers’ identities by analyzing the data collected during
an inShopnito session or by linking different transactions
using data mining techniques. Third, an external adversary
that tries to break the security and privacy guarantees offered
by inShopnito via passive attacks (e.g., eavesdropping com-
munications), active attacks (e.g., man-in-the-middle attacks)
or by getting access to a customer’s smartphone.
Furthermore, we assume that the system has been properly
initialized and that no linkable or identifiable information
is leaked by other operations (e.g., payments) or protocols
(e.g., data link or network information).
B. General Description
In this section we describe how the inShopnito app is used
by customers during a visit to a retailer’s store (e.g., grocery
shop). In particular, we focus on the security and privacy
mechanisms used on each step of the shopping session.
Registration: To use the inShopnito app, customers first
need to register and obtain an inShopnito credential. In our
design, the inShopnito credential is an Idemix credential [15]
(i.e., anonymous credential) with the minimal attributes
1Secure cloud storage support will be added in the near future.
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Figure 1. inShopnito’s mobile and server components
required by the retailer. To create their accounts and obtain
their credentials, customers can reveal personally identifiable
information (e.g., name, address, gender, etc.). inShopnito
guarantees that customers’ transactions will not be asso-
ciated with their accounts. The retailer itself or a trusted
third-party can act as registration authority. In addition,
customers could register remotely over the Internet using the
inShopnito app or in person. Furthermore, the phone’s secure
element is initialized with applets for the secure storage
and voucher component2. After a successful registration, a
customer is issued an inShopnito credential. The credential
and its secret are securely stored in the customer’s smart-
phone using inShopnito’s secure storage component (Section
IV-E). Moreover, credentials can include an expiration date,
after which customers will need to renew them.
Starting the app: To start the inShopnito app, cus-
tomers need to authenticate first. For this purpose, the app
prompts customers for a PIN or password (previously set
up during app installation) that is used to decrypt and load
data from the secure storage (i.e., credential and its secret,
loyalty points, vouchers and local profile information). After
successful authentication, customers can access all the app
information. For instance, loyalty point and voucher balance,
previous transactions and information revealed to the retailer
can be inspected.
Connecting to the inShopnito server: To start a shop-
ping session, customers need to connect to the retailer’s
inShopnito server. In our design, we assume that the retailer
provides a Wi-Fi network in its facilities to access the server
(remote access over a cellular data networks is possible too).
The inShopnito app includes a list of the retailer’s Wi-Fi
access points and servers as well as their corresponding
SSL/TLS certificates. Using this information, the inShopnito
2As inShopnito aims to be practical, it can also function without secure
elements. This, however, disables the voucher component and weakens
security guarantees for stored data.
app automatically connects and authenticates the Wi-Fi
access point. Next, the inShopnito app establishes a secure
SSL/TLS connection and authenticates the inShopnito server
using the stored SSL/TLS certificates. Furthermore, we will
add software attestation in the future.
Starting an anonymous shopping session: After con-
necting to the server, the inShopnito client sends a request
for a new session to the server. In response, the server
sends back its authentication policy and a random nonce.
The authentication policy indicates the required and optional
attributes the customer should satisfy to start a new session
(i.e., anonymous customer authentication). For example, the
authentication policy may require the customer to prove
she owns a valid credential and she is an adult and op-
tionally to reveal her shopping preferences and zip code.
If the customer accepts the policy, then the inShopnito’s
credential component (Section IV-A) generates an Idemix
zero-knowledge proof that satisfies the policy and sends it to
the server. Optionally, the app can remember the customer’s
acceptance of the current authentication policy. In this way,
the customer will only be asked again in the future if the
policy changes. If the proof is correctly validated by the
server’s credential component, then a new shopping basket
and a unique session ID are created for the customer. In
addition, a copy of the shopping basket is also created in the
mobile app. The shopping basket contains the information
revealed by the customer in the authentication proof. Still,
in most cases this information is not enough to reveal the
customer’s identity; thus, the created session is anonymous.
Shopping and recommendations: Based on informa-
tion revealed in the previous step, the customer receives
recommendations and discount coupons from the server
(Section IV-D). For instance, if the customer only revealed
the minimal information required, then she will only receive
generic recommendations and coupons. The customer can
now proceed to scan items with her smartphone and add
them to the inShopnito shopping basket. At any moment
before checkout, the customer can add or delete items
or modify the amount of a particular item. In addition,
the customer can access information about the item (e.g.,
description, reviews) and about the total amount due. Every
time the shopping basket is modified in the mobile app,
the server’s shopping basket is also updated. Moreover, the
server’s recommendation component periodically reviews
the customer’s shopping basket and sends new recommenda-
tions and coupons based on the current items in the shopping
basket.
Checkout: Before checking out, the customer decides
if she wants to redeem loyalty points and vouchers for
discounts or other benefits. For example, in our scenario,
loyalty points and vouchers are used to provide a direct
discount from the total amount due by the customer (1
loyalty point = 1 cent). The loyalty point (Section IV-B) and
voucher (Section IV-C) components allow the customer to
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Figure 2. inShopnito’s checkout screen. The customer uses one voucher
and 250 loyalty points worth e1 and e2.5 respectively.
redeem loyalty points and vouchers in a privacy-preserving
way. The customer can select the amount of loyalty points
and vouchers to use and review the total discount achieved
(Figure 2). Subsequently, during checkout, the loyalty points
and voucher components generate the proofs required to
redeem the selected loyalty points and voucher. In addition,
if the transaction earns the customer new loyalty points,
then the server will send them to the mobile app. Next,
a payment operation is executed, which is assumed to be
privacy-friendly (e.g., cash or privacy-friendly credit card).
Finally, the transaction details are added to local profile
component of the inShopnito app.
IV. INSHOPNITO COMPONENTS
In this section, we present more details of inShopnito’s
main components (Figure 1).
A. Credentials
The credential component manages the operations as-
sociated with inShopnito’s credentials in the mobile app
and the server. As previously stated, inShopnito’s design
relies on Idemix credentials [15]; however, support for other
anonymous credentials systems is also possible. In the mo-
bile app, the credential component takes care of processing
the server authentication policy, creating the corresponding
authentication proofs, generating commitments to attributes
in the credential and requesting new or updating existent
credentials. At the server side, the credential component
deals with issuing or updating credentials and validating
authentication proofs. Moreover, we use our own develop-
ment framework [16] to facilitate the integration of Idemix
credentials and support future credentials technologies.
B. Loyalty Points
The main goals of the loyalty points component is to
allow customers to earn and redeem loyalty points in a
privacy-preserving way and to give retailers better control
over and security of loyalty point operations. For this
purpose, we rely on our own anonymous and unlinkable
incentives scheme [17]. By default, inShopnito’s loyalty
points cannot be associated with a particular transaction
or customer identity. Hence, customer privacy is achieved
by guaranteeing anonymity and unlinkability while earning
and redeeming loyalty points. Still, customers can prove
anonymously (via zero-knowledge proofs) that a particular
loyalty point is linked to their inShopnito credentials (i.e.,
the loyalty point was issued to them). This approach allows
the retailer to prevent illegal sharing of loyalty points and
to make theft more difficult. In addition, the retailer keeps a
log of redeemed loyalty points to detect and prevent double-
spending. These properties are achieved by using different
cryptographic building blocks such as anonymous creden-
tials (i.e., Idemix [15]), zero-knowledge proofs [18], com-
mitment schemes [19] and partially blind signatures [20].
Despite of the heavy cryptographic operations and the use
of a mobile platform, our experimental results (Section
V) show that our design and implementation are efficient
enough for our shopping scenario.
To earn loyalty points, the customer needs to complete
a transaction with the retailer. After an interactive protocol,
the customer receives a loyalty point that consists of the
following values:
LoyaltyPoint = [V, I, comm(LS), SigR(V, I, comm(LS))]
where V is the value of the loyalty point, I is public
information that define rules on how the loyalty point should
be used (e.g., expiration), comm(LS) is a commitment to
a secret value in the customer credential (loyalty secret)
and SigR() is a partially blind signature on the previous
values generated by the retailer. The customer and retailer
know the first two values (V and I) while the last value
(comm(LS)) is only known to the customer. To ensure
a sufficient level of anonymity, the set of possible values
and public information combinations should be general and
determined in advance (i.e., fixed values). To redeem, the
customer sends her loyalty points to the retailer together
with a zero-knowledge proof that shows that the customer
owns a valid inShopnito credential and that its loyalty secret
corresponds to the commitment in the loyalty points to be
redeemed. In addition, the retailer verifies that the loyalty
points have not expired, the commitment has not been used
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before and that the blind signature is correct. For more
details about our unlinkable incentives scheme, please refer
to our technical report [17].
C. Anonymous Offline Vouchers
Vouchers represent an amount of money issued to cus-
tomers by the retailer itself (e.g., a refund) or by other
parties (e.g., a job benefit). They can also include rules
on how they may be spent. The inShopnito voucher com-
ponent allows customers to receive and spend vouchers
with better privacy and security guarantees. In addition,
retailers and voucher issuers also benefit from increased
control and security. Similarly to loyalty points, our voucher
scheme achieves privacy by making voucher issuing and
spending operations unlinkable (however, only spending is
anonymous). While loyalty points rely on an online system
for redeeming and for double-spending prevention, vouchers
use an offline approach based on a tamper-resistant secure
element (SE) [21]. The voucher component assumes that no
data can be extracted from the SE and that the SE executes
all tasks as specified in the Voucher Applet (i.e., that it is
trustworthy). This ensures that no voucher will ever “exist
twice”. Vouchers are deleted the moment they are transferred
to another SE. As a result, double-spending is prevented. It
is clear that this property is broken if a voucher ever leaves
the secure environment of the SE in an unencrypted form.
The issuing service has two key pairs: one that it uses
to sign vouchers and a second one to prove its identity.
Upon registration to the service, each customer or retailer
obtains an SE, which has the voucher applet pre-installed.
The SE also contains a unique private key and corresponding
certificate signed by the issuing service. This private key,
generated on the SE, is not known to anybody. The SE uses
this key pair to prove that it is indeed certified and that the
customer has registered for the service. Furthermore, the SE
also contains copies of the two public keys of the issuer.
A voucher issued to a customer contains the following
information:
Voucher = [V,E, P, n,SigI(V,E, P, n)]
where V corresponds to the monetary value of the voucher,
E is the expiration date, P defines a set of properties (e.g.,
transferable or not transferable to other customers), n is a
random serial number and SigI is a signature by the issuer.
The signature is a partially blinded signature, i.e., the issuer
and the customer know the first arguments (V , E and P ),
but the issuer has no information on the last argument (n).
The issuing protocol consists of two parts. First we have
a mutual authentication stage in which both parties prove
their identities. This authentication phase results in a fresh,
random shared session key. Once the identities have been
verified and the shared key has been established, one or
more vouchers can be created for this customer. In this case
the recipient proves with a key pair registered to the system
that it is an SE. The session key is used to set up a secure
and authentic channel between the SE and the issuer. This
channel is used for the exchange of all messages of the
second stage.
For the second stage, we use the partially blinded sig-
nature scheme described in [20]. We are using the scheme
unaltered with the following conventions: info = V,E, P
and msg = n ∈R Z. The random number n is generated
inside the SE and serves as a unique serial number for
the voucher. It is blinded during the signing phase; the
issuing service does not know this serial number. The shared
parameter info is known to both the customer and the issuing
service. In order to ensure sufficient anonymity, the set
of possible info values should be limited compared to the
number of vouchers. After this second stage, the SE of the
customer contains a fresh Voucher. This stage is repeated if
more than one voucher is issued.
To transfer one or more vouchers to either another cus-
tomer or a retailer, we only need to transfer a Voucher and
the corresponding signature to the other party. It is essential
during transfer that the receiving party proves that it is in
fact a registered SE (to prevent leaking of vouchers outside
the system). For privacy, it is essential that the “paying”
party does not reveal its identity. Again, first a secure
channel is established between the two parties (with the
recipient proving its identity). During transfer, the voucher
and its signature are encrypted and authenticated using the
established session key, preventing an eavesdropper from
duplicating it.
D. Local Profile and Recommendation System
A privacy-friendly recommendation system can enhance
customer’s shopping experience without sacrificing privacy.
Many popular recommendation techniques base their sug-
gestions on the behaviour data of all users. inShopnito
applies algorithms that can give relevant recommendations
to customers using just their own data [22]. The customers
manage local profiles on their own device, instead of the
retailer gathering vast amounts of data on all customers.
A new shopping basket is created on the server when
customers have anonymously authenticated, after which
products can be added to this basket. The server includes a
recommendation system and a product database containing
metadata (e.g., category information, ingredients, etc.) for
every item that the store has for sale. The recommendation
system suggests products or discount coupons which have
similar metadata as the products that are already in the bas-
ket. As more products are added to the basket, the customer’s
profile will become more refined and the recommendations
are likely to become more accurate.
With inShopnito, the server is unable to link new shopping
sessions to any one particular customer. It is not possible
to tie any personal information such as age or gender to
a certain shopping session, and there is no knowledge of
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past shopping behavior. Historic consumption behavior is
highly useful for recommendation systems, hence the recom-
mendations will initially be of poor quality. This is known
as the cold start problem [23]. inShopnito therefore offers
the customer incentives to voluntarily disclose personal or
historical information. Customers can choose to reveal more
information than necessary during authentication by reveal-
ing additional credential attributes. In addition, inShopnito
keeps the customer’s shopping history in a local profile on
the smartphone itself. This historical information is used
to compile a preference profile, which assigns customer
preferences to categories. These preferences can be used by
the retailer to suggest relevant recommendations.
E. Secure storage
inShopnito’s loyalty points, vouchers and local profile
information are an interesting target for attackers. Therefore
inShopnito uses a secure storage component to store the
cryptographic keys that are used to decrypt the inShopnito
credential, the credential secret and the database secret. The
latter is subsequently used to open the encrypted database
which contains the customer’s local profile. Specific details
of this component can be found in [24].
Assuming the device is not rooted, the sandboxes of
Windows Phone, iOS and Android provide relatively similar
protection against malware. The situation is different with
physical attacks [25]. We assume that the customer has not
weakened the device security, i.e., a screen lock is config-
ured, ADB is disabled and the device is not rooted. Contrary
to Windows Phone 8+ and iOS 4+, file system encryption in
Android is neither hardware-backed nor enabled by default3.
Following the physical attack model, the remaining feasible
approach is executing dictionary and brute-force attacks on
the encryption passcode [26]. Hardware-backed encryption
forces these attacks to take place on the device, making them
prohibitively slow. If hardware backing is not present, as is
the case on most Android devices, the adversary can leverage
offline computing power.
To address this issue, we introduce a secure storage
component that relies on the properties of a tamper-resistant
secure element. An enrolled app can use its SE to execute
trust-sensitive operations (e.g. voucher redemptions) or to
access keys in its credential store, which are required for
authentication or encryption. The secure element enforces
app-specific access through a secret that it shares with the
app, due to prior enrollment. Before an app is allowed access
to its credential store, the secure element asks for the user’s
consent by prompting for her passcode. An attempt limit
prevents brute-force and dictionary attacks.
3Only hardware-backed KeyChain storage is provided on supporting
devices that run version 4.3 or higher.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have implemented the inShopnito system as an An-
droid application and a Java-based server. The tests were
performed on a Samsung Galaxy S3 with a 1.4 GHz pro-
cessor and Android 4.1.2. We installed the inShopnito-server
component on a workstation with an Intel R© Core
TM
i7-3770
CPU and Ubuntu 13.04. The SE is a G&D Mobile Security
Card 1.0 [21] and the encrypted database is implemented
using SQLCipher for Android.
During application start-up, inShopnito sets up a secure
channel to the SE in order to decrypt the inShopnito cre-
dential, the credential’s secret and the database secret. 15
samples of the application start-up were taken. On average,
7.3 seconds are required to start the app, of which 3.5
seconds are taken up by setting up the secure channel
with the SE and performing the decryption operations. The
remainder is consumed by opening the encrypted database.
Note that accessing the SE for decryption and opening the
encrypted database are operations that are only performed
during application start-up. Hence, we consider this result
practical for people to use. However, faster access is possible
by relying on the Android Keyring instead of an SE to man-
age encryption keys, trading off security for performance.
In order to measure the anonymous authentication and
session establishment, we have assumed a worst-case sce-
nario were the user has chosen to hide as many attributes
in her credential as possible, while still disclosing part of
her preference profile. The average for 100 samples is 1.47
seconds using 2048-bit Idemix keylength and a 5-attribute
Idemix credential.
To obtain vouchers, the SE creates a partially blinded sig-
nature with the voucher issuer. This SE needs 2.73 seconds
to perform all cryptographic operations for a keylength of
1024-bit. In addition, it needs 1.54 seconds to verify the
integrity of the voucher. Redeeming vouchers only requires
a secure connection to be set up between the SEs, which
requires under half a second to finish.
We measured the time it takes to earn and redeem sets
of loyalty points (see Table I). Note that we do not take
the actual value of the points into account, but the total
quantity of tokens. The time it takes to earn points is linear
to the number of points that is being issued, as one partially
blinded signature has to be created for each point. However,
the number of issued loyalty points generally will not exceed
10 because, similar to paper money, the denomination of
each loyalty point can be chosen from a set of predetermined
denominations. Redeeming points is almost independent of
the number of loyalty points being redeemed. This is because
inShopnito uses only one zero-knowledge proof to assert that
all points are linked to the customer’s credential, rather than
having one proof per point.
Using these results, we can give a conservative estimation
of the total checkout time. Assume that a customer redeems
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Table I
TOTAL EARNING AND REDEEMING TIMES OF BATCHES OF 1, 2, 5 AND
10 LOYALTY POINTS. THE TIMES INCLUDE COMPUTATIONS PERFORMED
ON CLIENT AND SERVER AS WELL AS THE NETWORK TIME. THE MEAN
TIMES FOR 100 SAMPLES ARE LISTED IN MILLISECONDS.
Number of Points 1 2 5 10
Earning (ms) 437 640 1282 2421
Redeeming (ms) 742 754 779 807
one voucher and five separate loyalty points, while in return
she earns ten separate loyalty points. This adds up to a total
time of 3.7 seconds , which illustrates that inShopnito is
indeed practical to use.
VI. DISCUSSION
inShopnito’s loyalty points and vouchers rely on sig-
natures to prevent their forgery: only those with a valid
signature are accepted by retailers. In addition, it ensures
that only the retailer or issuer can create new, valid vouchers
and loyalty points, as only they have access to the private
signature keys. Furthermore, these digital signatures ensure
that altering parts of a voucher or loyalty point is detectable.
inShopnito can prohibit sharing of loyalty points between
customers by linking them to a personal inShopnito creden-
tial. In that case, the customer is required to prove this link
using a zero-knowledge proof when the point is redeemed.
Online double-spending of loyalty points is prevented by
keeping a database containing all spent ones. The retailer is
able to regularly expunge points from this database if these
points contain an expiration date.
Contrary to loyalty points, it can be desirable to hand
over vouchers to another person. The voucher’s properties
determine whether or not it is transferable (cfr. section IV-C).
Double voucher spending is prevented through the use of the
trusted execution environment and the fact that no voucher
will ever leave this environment unprotected. Every time
a voucher leaves the SE (for example, when in transit to
another SE), the communication link is secured end-to-
end, with the end-points being the two communicating SEs.
Finally, the issuer keeps a record of vouchers that have been
returned. A denial of service attack on inShopnito is possible
by executing a large number of authentication requests
and session initiations. inShopnito requires customers to
first anonymously authenticate using their Idemix credential.
However, denial of service can be limited by using domain
pseudonyms. Every owner of an Idemix credential can
generate exactly one valid domain pseudonym per given
domain. Hence, retailers can choose a time-frame as domain
and enforce the usage of domain pseudonyms by altering
the authentication policy. The same domain pseudonym is
generated the second time someone tries to authenticate in
a given time-frame, which is detectable.
The unlikability of voucher and loyalty point transactions
is protected through the use of a partially blinded signature.
This enables the issuer to verify what it is signing, while
it also prevents the issuer from linking issued vouchers
and points to redeemed ones at a later stage. Furthermore,
inShopnito uses the Idemix credential system to safeguard
the customer’s anonymity during authentication. This pre-
vents the retailer from linking multiple sessions of the
same customer together and thus from building detailed
profiles. However, customers can selectively disclose data,
like credential attributes or data derived from their prefer-
ence profile. However, if the customer consents to release
additional shopping data, an extra measure is taken to protect
her privacy. Instead of releasing the precise shopping history
down to each individual product, the inShopnito application
discloses only what types of products the customer is inter-
ested in. The metadata of products that have been purchased
in the past is used to construct a preference profile which
is then disclosed to the retailer. In addition, customers are
able to modify their shopping history and preference profile
(e.g., remove sensitive transactions).
A retailer could modify inShopnito’s authentication policy
so customers are required to reveal identifiable information
to authenticate. That is why transparency is a key aspect
of the inShopnito application. inShopnito provides a user
interface through which the customer can see her shopping
history, preference profile and the authentication policy. This
way, the customer gains insight into what data has been
collected so far and is able to take more informed decisions
about disclosing extra information.
The inShopnito application prevents external adversaries
monitoring communication channels from learning anything,
as all channels are encrypted by SSL/TLS. In addition, man-
in-the-middle attacks are prevented, as inShopnito explicitly
verifies the used certificates.
inShopnito uses a secure storage component to protect
customers against an external adversary who got hold of
their smartphone and wants to get access to the vouchers,
loyalty points or transactional data. The cryptographic keys
used to decrypt the inShopnito credential and the database
password are kept in a SE and can only be accessed if
the correct passcode is entered. Regarding security, the gap
with iOS and Windows Phone is bridged. Not only are
offline passcode attacks prevented, the secure element is also
blocked as soon as the passcode entry limit is exhausted.
This makes data on the device unavailable, in a similar
manner as an iOS or Windows Phone wipe. Because of the
limited number of attempts, the passcode may be short and
non-complex, keeping the usability burden small.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented inShopnito, a mobile shopping
assistant that offers a rich set of features without sacrificing
the privacy of the user. We accomplished this by integrating
multiple PETs into a single cohesive, usable application.
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Our privacy-friendly approach to authentication, data stor-
age, loyalty programs, discount vouchers and personalized
recommendations provides benefits and protection to both
customers and retailers. The proposed solution includes
protective measures against forgery and privacy threats origi-
nating from malicious customers, overly curious retailers and
external adversaries. Our performance evaluation showed
that under worst-case circumstances the application still
performs adequately. Future work will focus on an increased
performance and usability of inShopnito.
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